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IN THE SUPREME COUR'T 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
FRAN!{ BILL TOni, 
Plaintiff -Respondent, 
-vs.- Case No. 10241 
DAYS OF '±7, 
DcfcJz,dctnt-AppcllaJtt. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATE~IEXT OF l(IXD OF CASE 
Plaintiff while \\Tatching a rodeo sponsored by De-
fendant fell fro1n or ''Tas thro\vn from bleacher to con-
crete abut1nent on the ground below, fracturing skull, 
w·hen Brahma bull charged through fence in front of 
bleacher \vheTe Plaintiff sat. 
DISPO,SITIOX IN L,O\VER COURT 
Jury verdict of $18,548.80. 
RELIEF SOlTGIIT ON APP}~_AL 
Affirmance. 
STATE1\1EN'T 011., F AC1TS 
On July 21, 1962, Plaintiff, age 38, at time of trial 
(R. 183), his wife, and seven (R-174) of their eight chil-
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dren drove from Centerville,. utah, \Vhere they \Yorked 
in sugar beets, to Salt L·ake City, shopped around (R-
175), learned of the rodeo at the bus station (R·-79) and 
went to the State Fair Grounds after the rodeo had begun 
(R-115 and R-86, Line 5) ; ''It \\ras kind of late" (Larry 
Bill·T·om, R-86); "It was kind of late and that's \vhy tlHlY 
didn't have no open." (R-185, Frank Bill Ton1, Plaintiff); 
Q. And the show was partly over \vhen you got 
there~ 
.A.. Yes, sir. 
Q. You didn't see the \\rholc sh0\\r ~ Is that right~ 
A. Yes, sir. (R-106, Larry Bill Tom). 
No ticket was paid; apparently I) lain tiff offered to 
pay but was invited in; 
Q. Now, you did not buy a ticket to go into the 
rodeo, did you~ 
A. No. 
Q. Had the ticket office closed when you got 
there~ 
A. They wasn't ,closed but I told them I was go-
ing to do that and he told me to go and bring 
my family in. iThen I went out and bring 
them in. (R-193, Frank Bill Tom, Plaintiff) 
Plaintiff, according to his testimony, drove into town 
without drinking (R-184) ; drank nothing in Salt Lake 
City ·(R-185) ; according to Larry Bill T'om there 'vas no 
liquor in the car (R-79), none was taken to the rodeo 
grounds (R-79') and Plaintiff ''had not had anything to 
drink before he went in the rodeo" (R-79); nothing 'vas 
bought at the rodeo (R-86 and 87); according to Alice 
Tom no liquor was consumed en route (R-174), none 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
\Vhile shopping and while at fairgrounds (R-175), none 
\ras in the car (R-175). Plaintiff, according to Dr. 
\V right, \vho exarnined Plaintiff approximately 11 :45 
(R-220), shortly after the end of the rodeo, the Brah1na 
'bull event being the last itern on the progran1 (R.-2GG), 
had no odor of alcohol about him ( R-205), although the 
doctor customarily (R-299) looked for evidence of drink-
ing or of intoxication. A police1nan at the tirne of the 
grand entry ( l~-2-:1:7), that is, at the beginning of the 
rodeo, and three hours before the injury (R--:~35) oh-
sci·v '-·d tr,.~o adult Indians vvith Plaintiff, "'in their forties" 
(li.-:~3:2) carrying beer into the fairgrounds-obviously 
uiifci·ent Indians since Plaintiff carne late: 
Q. In other vvords, \Vere the ticket booths all 
closed up and they vveren't selling tickets any 
more! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And the show was partly over when they got 
there~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You didn't see the whole show~ Is that right~ 
A. Yes, sir. (R-106) 
Defendant's witness, l\1acey (R-1-±5) could smell alco-
hol, but there were "beer cans and whiskey bottl(~~" ( l{-
131) all around where P1aintiff lay unconscious ai'tcr his 
InJury. 
Plaintiff, his son Larry, and son ·Clarence (1~-82) 
sat on the top row of the bleacher \Vith l_)laintiff's wife and 
two children (R-81) seated on the fourth row (R-82) about 
t\vo rows removed (R-176) in front of Plaintiff (Exhibit 
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B-2), while the two remaining children re1naincd asleep 
in the automobile (R-92). 
A half hour or so (R·-87), thereafter, a onv-ton 
Brahma bull (R-131) \vas teased by perfor1ners (R-87) 
''and they took tubes to that Brah1na, and he got 1nad 
and came towards us ... " (Larry Bill To1n) ; ~· ... and it 
took him about four times to put hiin back in the rorl·al 
and came back out and started chasing hi1n around 'vith 
the innertube. :That's what 1nade the bull get mad and 
went through the fence." (R-178, Alice rl,o1n) ; the bull, 
enraged, (R-87 and 177) charged through the fence (R-
114); ·under it according to :1Iacey (R-133), Defendant's 
witness called to testify by Plaintifi; b._t,veen the cables 
and top rail according to \V"hit,~sides (R-281); between 
the rail and the cables above the top rail according to 
Rudd (R-265) ; and according to Lar1·y 1J,o1n (lt-88) be-
tween the rail and the wire; at any rate, the bull negoti-
ated the fence successfully (R-130) and got to ''within a 
foot and a half or couple of feet of w·here the spectators 
were sitting on the bleachers" (R-114, Macey, Defendant's 
witness); and according to Alice Tom (R-189) "'right into 
the crowd." 
The bull was then, not Honto the track" as Defend-
ant's brief, page 2, indicates, but in the spectators' de-
partment. 
~''The bull got through the fence and charged 
towards the crowd and got approximately to the 
crowd and reared back, stopped, looked at the 
crowd, looked to the east, looked to the 'vest, and 
took off to the west." ( R-144, Macey) 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 






"They did scatter. They jumped up and push-
ed to the east and the vvest because there is open-
ings in that area." (R-145, Macey) 
The spectators ~v.ere 
"Stumbling ·over each other" (R-178), Alic~ 
Tom); 
"Everyone just ju1np off the bleachers and 
there was no one left there." (R-189, Alice To1n); 
"They got seared. Everybody vvas scared and 
they just started to run ... " (R-195, Frank Bill 
Tom, Plaintiff) ; 
Q. When you ju1nped off vvhat was the situation 
as far as the people in front of you and your 
family~ 
.. A.. They \Vt~re standing up and shouting. ( TI -S9, 
Larry Bill Tom) 
Naturally the spe-ctators st~mpeded. 
Larry Tom, sitting with Plaintiff on the top seat 
(there was no back rail, R-84),-jumpe·d off (R-87). Plain-
tiff from behind his wife and children told her to leave 
(R-178 and R-181). She and the children jumped off 
(R-181). "They (the children) were the first ones off." 
(R-181, Alice Tom) 
Plaintiff heard his wife call "What shall we do·~" (R-
186). He answered: "Go on. Get up. I)1:1 going to try to 
grab" and I grabbed. That's all I re1ne1nber. It throwed 
Ine of.I, I guess." Plaintiff was ·'thtowed off" or fell off, 
o1· \vas knocked off the bleacher. Plaintiff was "sitting 
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there" as Larry jumped (R-89). Larry jumped and ran. 
but turned around (R-87). "There was n1y father laying 
on the ground" behind the stand (Exhibit P-2) Plaintiff 
having gone off in the same direction Larry went off (R-
90). Plaintiff's head struck concrete (Exhibit P-10) (R-
98) and he was bleeding from the ear (R-98) and uncon-
scious when L~arry turned, and when his wife, who also 
jumped from the bleacher, then saw hlln lying unconscious 
(R-178). 
Defendant's brief, page 3, reads: "1-Ie believed that 
he was thro-vvn by the bull over the grandstand (R-186 and 
R-196)." Language difficulties taken in a light most 
favoring levity, R-186, R-196, and elsewhere, yield no such 
ludiocrisy. 
Plaintiff regained consciousness in the hospital and 
his last 1ne1nory is of trying to grab the rope (R-186) 
and to protect his family (R-187), and he did not remem-
ber the instant of falling. Blotting out of memory of the 
moments before an accident causing skull fracture and un-
consciousness is "usually the case" (R-212, Dr. Wright), 
and s·uch an injury can cause "hallucinations in which 
a person may think he remembers certain things \vhich 
never did occur." (R-230, Dr. vVright) 
Plaintiff always maintained that he tried to grab the 
rope (R-186) and on cross-exarnination (R-198) ruls\vcr-
ed: 
Q. And you do reme1nber grabbing the rope~ 
A. Yes. 
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Other vvitnesses 1naintained the rope (there were four 
ropes on the bull, R-87, Larry Bill Tom) was not actually 
grabbed by Plaintiff. 
vVithout question, the Plaintiff fell or 'vas thro,vn off 
the bleachers simultaneously with the bull stampeding 
the cro,vd, and according to Plaintiff because of it-
A. My wife, she called rne. "vVhat shall 've do~" 
she said. 
"Go on. Get up. I'm going to try to grab." 
And I grabbed. That's all I ren1ember. It 
throwed me off, I guess. 
Q. vVhat "rere you trying to do, l\fr. Torn? 
A. Tried to grab that rope. I grabbed the rope 
and I guess it 'vent up .. That thing throvved 
me off. 
Q. And why vvere you trying to grab the rope~ 
A. Because ·my kids was running in this direction 
where the bull was. 
Q. Do you .remember falling at all~ 
A. No, I don't remember nothing after. That's 
all I remember now. 
Q. Where was the bull when you were trying to 
grab the rope~ 
A. Going past. Everybody was just scared and 
running and I just grabbed that ropP to put it 
on one of the seats. 
Q. Now when you woke up, ~Ir. Tom, where were 
you~ 
A. I was in the rospital. (R-116, 117, Plaintiff) 
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The jury in response to the question: "Did Fran:~ 
Bill Tom fall from the bleacher because of the charge 
of the bull and resulting movement of the cro,vd ~" an-
svvered "Yes," all eight jurors signing. 
The fence was inadequate according to the fence 
expert, l\1cLaughlin (R-160), and this for several reasons: 
1. Brittle cast iron eye tops, now discontinued, 
v1ere used to fasten the top rail to the posts 
(R-87). 
2. The eye tops were already broken, old breaks 
indicated by the rust (R-137); therefore, the 
eye tops could serve little purpose. (Exhibit 
P -12, the broken eye tops). (Exhibits 5, 6, 8, 
9, photos taken the ).1onday after the acci-
dent). (R-153) 
Q. And if broken in place on the posts would 
that hold the rail in place~ 
A. Well, the rail could stay there, yes, but 
if it was hit it would fly off. (R-158, 
McLaughlin) 
3. The fence was without tension wire at the 
bottom (R-158) used, according to McLaugh-
lin, "to keep the bottom of the· fence tight 
because chain link fence is flexible. (R-158) 
and 
"Well, the botton1 is too ~lexible, and any 
force that hit it ''Tould cause the 'vire to 
give at the point of i1npact, and hold up 
so that whatever hit it could pass under-
neath it or it could go up between the top 
rail and the "·ire if it \\Tasn't adeqnatPly 
fastened to the top rail." (R-160, ~fc­
Laughlin) 
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~facey, Defendant's \\~itness, testified that the bull 
.,yent under the fence (R-133); Larry Bill To1n that it \vent 
bet\veen the rail and the net "Tire (R-88). 
-±. The chain link fencing \Vas tied to the top 
rail with 11-gauge vvire, which-
Q. \\T ould there be any use of having 9-gauge 
fence if you tied it \vith 11-gauge \Vire ·~ 
A. \Vell, it "Tas not too practical, especially 
\vith the fence on that side where the 
pressure \\~ould be. 
5. The chain link fence or net "~ire \v·as on the 
vvrong side of the post, that is, on the spec-
tators' side (R-161). 
Q. Why is it on the vvrong side~ 
~~. \\Tc·ll, if it Y~Tas hjt and tied like it js \vith 
an animal from this side or anything else 
it would have a tendency to go through. 
Q. What if it had been hit-that is, if the 
net wire had been on the arena side, vvhat 
then~ 
A. Well, this way it would stretch the wire 
but it wollld'nt give quite as easily as it 
would on the other side because it could-
.n't pop the ties, you see. (R-161, 162, 
Macy) 
G. An eye-high rail was not in plaeP (R--88, J.J'ar;·~· 
Bill '11om) the night of the accidPnt, though 
a 2 x 6 was placed the next morning after the 
bull went through the arena (R-289, 88); and 
such a rail is a c,__1stomary item on livestock 
fences (R-162, McLaughlin) and according 
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to Willian1 S. Young, for t\venty years a rod .. o 
operator (R-1G6, such an obstruction is custo-
mary-
A. Most generally the committee where 've 
go to the town has paper or a board 1 x 6, 
2 x 6, 2 x 8 around so that the animal when 
he bucks up to the fence has something 
to see. 
Q. Now has this been true during the twenty 
years that you have been in the business~ 
A. Yes, sir, always. 
Q. Have you observed whether or not this 
board which is a visual obstruction keep 
the Brahma a'vay fron1 the fence gen-
erally speaking~ 
A. Yes, sir. (R-168 and 169) 
This bull weighed a ton (R-131), had eighteen-inch 
horns (R-264), had tried to break out earlier (R-131). 
Brahma bulls for rodeo eXhibition ·are normally trained 
to become belligerent (R-165) ; the use generally made 
is to "get them to fighting" (R-166) and "the meaner you 
get them the more spectacular it is to the crowd." (R-167, 
WilliamS. Young); they are "handled cautiously even at 
the home ranch" (R-167) and "when "~e take them out to 
a rodeo, why, we expect then1 to perform," ... 
Q. When they perfor1n they actually chase people 
and try to hook the1n or run the1n down. Is 
that right~ 
A. Yes, sir. (R. 1~67, Willia1n S. Young) 
Plaintiff was beneath the bleacher unconscious, bleed-
ing fron1 the ear (R-99, R-1'78) ; ""as taken by runbulanee 
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to the hospital where he was seen that night by Dr. 
\V right, a neuro-surgeon ( R .. 202), who noted that I) lain-
tiff vvas losing blood and spinal fluid from the right ear 
( R-203) and that Plaintiff had suffered "a severe skull 
fracture \vhich had broke'n the bone and torn the tissue 
all the \vay do\vn into the 1niddle ear and let the blood 
and spinal fluid lea:~ out through that fracture and those 
teal's."; and the doctor \vrote do\vn his impressions at the 
tin1~~~ as being "that there vvas a skull fracture, a brain 
injury, and then the various abrasions and bruises that 
I have nrentioned." (R-204) 
r·laintiff \VaS hospitalized 17 days, treated to prevent 
1nenengitis and to control vo1niting. He \Vas partially 
con0cious some 24 hours after he vvas first seen (R-206), 
and i1i the next fe\v days becarne n1ore coherent and talked 
coherently three days after the accident. He in1proved, 
compfained of dizziness (R~2b6), and the doctor noted 
''heating essentially absent in the right ear," and the 
doctor concluded that "'this was most probably a re·st1lt 
of' the injury which had· fractured the skull iri the area 
that let spinal fluid leak out through the right ear be-
cause it is that area of the skull that houses the nerve 
\vith which you hear on the right side." (R-207) 
Plaintiff was taken by his family to Gallup (R-94) 
and seen by D'r. Wright November 5, 1963, son1e 15 Inonths 
later, and complained " ... that he was unable to hear 
on the right side in the right ear. 1-le coinplained of dizzi-
ness which was periodic and which occurred chiefly when 
he was tired. He claimed that he was· rather tired all of 
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the time ~nd thought that he \Yas losing weight. He hrJ 
periodic pain over the upper part of the spine at the back 
of the chest and also in the lower part of the spine of the 
neck." (R-208, Dr. Wright) Hearing loss in the right ear 
\Vas confirmed \vith a tuning fork (R-209) and he was 
still disabled : 
Q. Was he in your opinion able at that time to 
resume the type of work that farm labor 
would do~ 
A. I suppose he could have returned to it, hut 
I doubt that he would have been much of a 
\Vorker. 
Q. What would have prevented him from being 
a worker~ 
A. Well, his weakness and his general condition 
and his complaining of being tired and losing 
\Veight. (R-209, 210) 
To1n was next seen by the doctor May 22, 1964; he 
believed his memory was poor (R-210), that his hearing 
on the right side was unchanged (R-10), that he was still 
weak (R-210); and even though the Plaintiff sustained 
another injury, after the November examination, the 
doctor in May, 1964, concluded that his diagnosis was un-
changed (R-211), that Plaintiff had suffered a brain 
injury (R-213. and R-218), that he "'"as pern1anently dis-
abled as a result of the injury (R-213), that the loss of 
hearing was probably pern1anent ( R-214), that the long 
period of unconsciousness "~as compatible \vith the diag-
nosis (R-206), that his memory i1npair1nent \vas probably 
permanent (R-213) and that this "'"as consistent \vith this 
type of injllry to the brain (R-213). 
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Dr. Haight, an ear doctor, determined that Plaintiff 
:l~a.d a 30% hearing loss on the right and a 50% loss on 
the left (R-232), that the patient related the hearing dif-
. ficulty dated fro In the fairgrounds accident ( R-232 and 
ll-:2.3G) Hby his state1nent that he had no hearing loss 
previous, and in our atteinpt to evaluate these things ,,~e 
1nu~t take the history into consideration." (R-236) 
And-
Q. . . . Is a hearing loss that is due to nerve 
i1npairn1ent of so1ne kind, is that a kind of 
loss \vhich 1nay result fro1n a skull fracture ? 
1\.. It's difficult to ans,ver that directly; ho,vever, 
I will put it this vvay: \vith a skull fracture 
if yon have bleeding into the inner ear then 
you probaby vvill have a hearing loss to son1e 
degree in every instance. (R-263) 
A. If there were a fracture sufficient to cause 
loss of spinal fluid and blood from the ear, 
I would anticipate· the:re would always be a 
hearing loss.· (R-237) 
Dr. Haight concluded that the blow on the head could 
cause a hearing injury to the· opposite ear (R-23S'), al-
though spinal fluid drainge was from the right ear. 
Before the accident Plaintiff's hearing was, ap1'a.-
ently, good (R-103, L·arry Bill Tom) ; I)1aintiff's hear-
ing was good from both ears prior to the accident (R-
187 and 188); hearing was bad ever since the accident in 
question (R-242); and was unafiucted by the January, 
1964, accident (R-242). 
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_Plaintiff was asked about his rnen1ory problems and 
also denied that the same were connected to the January 
subsequent accident. ·He said: 
Q. Now, have you observed whether or not you 
can hear normally out of your right ear since 
then~ 
A. Not so good. 
Q. Has that been in any way affected by this 
affray in January of 19·64, last-just last 
January~ Did that affect your hearing~ 
:A.· No. That was since that first time. 
Q. Now, l\lr. Tom, I think you told Doctor Wright 
that you were having memory problems. You 
weren't able to remember 1 
A. No. Now I said the same thing, san1e way. I 
don't remember anything. 
Plaintiff suffered permanent loss of earning capa-
city. Prior to the 2.Jcident he did plowing, irrigating, 
etc., while his childre11 thinned and weeded beets (R-189); 
his over-all health was good (R-102·, line 9') but after 
the accident he was not-able to do the work (R-189). The 
reason was "My head was hurting. I was dizzy." (R-190, 
Frank Bill ·rom, Plaintiff), and this disability was 
present not only after the subsequent incident or injury, 
made much of by D·efendant, Defendant's Brief, Page 5, 
l1ut the following spring, i.e., spring of 1963, before the 
subsequent accident, when the fru11ily \vent to Blackfoot, 
Idaho to work-
"every time he would get dizzy thinning beets" (R-101, 
Larry Bill Torn), and Plaintiff's hearing \Vhile in Black-
foot in 1963 was bad- . 
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Q. During 19:63 while you \Vere up in Blackfoot 
and before ~our father had this second in-
jury did you notice anything unusual about 
his hearing~ 
A. Hearing~ 
Q. Yes, his ability to hear. 
A. H-e wasn't hear good. 
Q. What~ 
A. He wasn't hear good. 
Q. Now before he was injured in the bull incident 
was his-did he have goG-d hearing, Mr. Torn, 
as far as y.ou were "ab.le to observe thatf 
THE COl~R.T: This \vitness can tell whether or 
not he noticed any tendency for hard of hear-
ing, and that's all. 
Q. Do you understand the court's state111ent to 
you, l\Ir. Tom~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. All right, what -can you tell us about your 
father's hearing~ 
A. He can heur good at that time (R-103, Larry 
Bill Tom) (Italics added.) 
Plaintiff's disability rendered him unable to work 
during the fall and winter of 1962 (R-190)-
Q. Were you able to work in the fall of 19G~ 'J 
A. No. 
Q. Why not~ 
A. I was pretty weak at that time. (R-190) 
Plaintiff first went to work following the accident 
the next summer (R-190) at Blackfoot, Idaho (R-190), 
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but suffered the incapacities noted above; he suffer~ J 
from dizziness (R-190) and headaches (R-190) and a::; 
of the date of trial, spring 1964, still suffered headache~ 
(R-190); and according to the \Yife his support of the 
fan1ily has largely been eliminated. 
A. He tell me he gets dizzy. That is the reason 
why he don't hardly vrork, and the boys arr 
only been supporting. (R-178, Alice Tom) 
POINT I. 
THE JURY'S FINDING OF PROXIl\iATE CAUSE WAS 
WELL SUPPORTED BY T'HE EVIDENCE. 
The direct and proxilnate cause requisite set forth 
in -± Ant. Jur., 2d, P. 217, A1nusen1ents and Exhibitions, 
Art. 94, cited by Defendant, (Brief, p. 11) \Yas adequately 
Inet. The bull caused the melee. It ca1ne to or "right into" 
( R-180) the crovvd. The cro\vd surged: p·eople scattered 
(R-145 ), stumbled over each other (R-178), cried (R-195), 
stood and shouted (R-89), "were scared" (R-195), scram-
bled to the sides (R-145); the ones in front "re~ally spread 
out" (R-145), there was ~a great commotion (R-178), 
everyone jumped off (R-180), everyone got up (R-181), 
were excited (R-197). We can imagine little less. 
In this n1elee Plaintiff fell or as he stated (R-186) 
was thrown from the bleacher; and the jury's conclusion 
Q. Did Frank Bill To1n fall from the bleachers 
because of the charge of the bull and the 
resulting movement of the crowd~ 
A. "Yes"-was fir1nly and realistically support-
ed. (R-1396) 
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THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 12 ON DEFEND-
ANT'S DUTY WAS CORRECT. 
Instruction K o. 12 reads : 
You are further instructed that the defend-
ant was under a duty to see that the fence was 
safe for the use for which it was intended, viz., to 
keep the bull out of the bleachers and in the arena; 
and in that connection you are instructed that it 
had a duty to so construct the fence so that it 
would serve the purposes for which it \vas intend-
ed and to use ·reasonable diligence commensurate 
with the risk involved to inspect it from time to 
time and see that it was kept in a proper condi-
tion to keep the animals in the arena; and if the 
defendant failed in either of these duties, it would 
he negligent. 
This bull was enormous, one ton (R-131) \Yith eight-
een-inch horns (R-264), had earlier tried to escape (R-
131). Rodeo exhibition Brahma bulls are \Vorse than 
wild animals; they are trained to be belligerent (R-166), 
to fight (R-166), expected to perform (R-167), unpredict-
able (R-169, vVilliam S. Young), very quick (R-2G6), no 
\vay 'vhatsoever to be able to tell what they will do 
(R-267); and in this instance the bull 'vas tantalized and 
tormented 'vith innertubes and ropes until h<~ 1> ctu:H' 
enraged. 
Defendant conducted the rodeo. Tll<' proble1n is to 
fran1o instruction properly definin<J' l)c•f('lldant's dut v b . 
'vith respect to containment of sueh trained bulls and this 
particular horned behemoth under its mental strain in-
tentionally induced. 
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The trial court in Instruction 12 told the jury that 
D·efendant's duty was to use reasonable care, coininc~n~ur­
ate with the risk involved to construct and keep a safe 
fence and to inspect it frorn time to tin1e to see that it 
was in proper condition for the use intended. 
·The fords "reasonable diligence' 'and "coinnH·nsur-
ate with the risk involved" rnodify and temper the \vhole 
p 1aragraph not just the "inspection" part, and only a 
strained construction can net a contrary conclusion. 
The paragraph, Instruction 1:2, in fairness to the 
speaker, must be, not dissected and each con1ponent re-
quired to have its modifying adjectiYe adjacent, \vith such 
repetition ~a.s that would entail, but read as a \\·hole and 
the reasonable import of its I:H:aning gathered fro111 
such a re·ading. 
Under the facts of the ca~l~, Defendant \\·as fortunate 
to enjoy an instruction so liberally worded. 
Many if not most jurisdictions and the weight of 
authority, if the R.estatemeut indicates the \veight, Re-
statement of the Law of Torts, Art. 509, as to the keeper 
of known dange-rous animals, apply a rule of rather strict 
liability, some under negligence theory finding a conclu-
sive p-resumption of negligence (See 69ALR 516, 22 ALR 
629, 80 ALR 2d 890), some denying that it is under a neg-
ligence theory, but in either event placing the gist of the 
action on the keeping with knO\\rledge. H£llntan vs. Gar-
cia, Calif. 283 P.2d 1033; llliller vs. ill c/( esson, 73 XY 
195; Alexander vs. ·Crockett, :Thiiss. 12± S\V 2d 534; Cou-
gress vs. Edker, 99 US 645, 2± L.Ed. ±87; Hansen cs. 
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Kemn~ish, Io\va 208 NvV 277; ±5 ALR 498; Benkey vs. 
Stepp, Okla. 184 P.2d 615; Crowley vs. Groonell, Vt. 50 
A 546; Greely vs. Jameson, 1\fass. 164 NE 385 (horse 
kno\vn to be a kicker); Chamberlain vs. Lindsey, 1\:Iiss. 
139 So. 812. Cases along the same line have been handed 
do\vn fron1 Ill., Ky., ~I e., ~I d., Mich., Nebr., Del., N.J., 
· Pa., Tenn., \\T ash., "\Vis., Colo., S.·C., and other jurisdic-
tions. 1rhe reason was stated in Earhart vs. Youngblood, 
:27 Pa. 331 to be: 
"The public is entitled to act upon the pre-
suinption that all dangerous animals are properly 
f . d " con 1ne .... 
Other courts do not make the owner an insurer but 
prescribe a high degree of care, placing the grava1nen 
·of the action on negligence in not keeping the anin1al 
secure, \vhich negligence, however, is presurned fro1n the 
•injury. Williams vs. Moray, 74 Ind. 25, 39 Am. R. 76; 
excellent discussion in Hayes vs. Smith, Ohio 56 l\I~ 879. 
Others apply ordinary negligence rule expressing the 
same in terms such as "reasonable diligence coininensur-
ate \\?ith the risk involved" as Instruction 12 contained, 
or various equivalent language. 
The writer believes Defendant could not have en-
joyed a more favorable instruction under 
divisions of authority. 
() ~· th ~~ 
California would approve a much ur~lch stronger 
instruction than Instruction 12. California Ju; y Instruc-
tions, Civil, 3rd Ed., Art. 217, P. 423, gives as a suggested 
or approved instruction the follo\ving: 
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"Where injury is done by a vicious or other-
wise dangerous anin1al, kno\vn to be such by it::; 
owner, the owner is liable to the injured person in 
'a sum that will compensate hi1n reasonably for all 
detriment suffered by him and resulting from thP 
injury, unless the injured person kno\vingly and 
voluntarily invited the injury and brought it upon 
himself. To have done that he voluntarily 1nust 
have done something \vith respect to the ani1nal 
that induced the injury and \vhich he either knew~ 
or should have known, was dangerous. 
"·This principle of la-\v does not require a 
finding that the owner \Vas negligent. The liabil-
ity attaches to his O\vnership of such an anilnal 
\vith knowledge of its dangerous character, and 
makes him insurer against injury done by it. Thus, 
in applying this rule of la \\T, you are r<~quired, 
first, to ask in answer of the question : \\'as the 
Plaintiff injured by a vicious or dangerous ani-
mal~ If so, two other questions 1nust be answ·ered: 
1. Was the animal then o\vned by the defendant 
in this action~ 2. Did the owner then have knowl-
edge of the dangerous character of the animal? 
"If those questions are ans\vered affirinative-
ly, there is a fourth issue : Did the Plaintiff 
knowingly and voluntarily invite the injury and 
bring it upon himself~" 
·The supplement of the above volume, Page 312, 
cites of interest Buff~ngton vs. Nicholson (1947) ~Calif., 
177 P'2d 51, a dog bite case, under California's dog bite 
law, where the California court, Page 53, notes: 
Since the gist of the tort 'is the keeping of 
a thing known to be dangerous, one who keeps 
or harbors an animal O\vned by another may be 
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liable, if he has such kno,vledge. A bailey with 
scienter is, of course, liable.' Prosser on Torts, 
Ch. 10, Sec. 57, P. '441. 
Utah has enacted such a dog-bite statute, 18-1-1, 
.Utah Code Annotated, 1953, that is, a statute 'vhich ab-
olishes scienter and the fact of that enactment may shed 
son1e light on \vhat the Utah law is as to the duty of 
containment of an animal known to be vicious or danger-
ous. 
As to the known dangerous disposition and potential-
ity of a Brahma sho\v bull, all experts in the instant case 
substantially agreed; the nature of the beast under such 
stress \Vas not substantially contradicted, and from the 
evidence, reasonable minds could not have differed as to 
~uch knowledge on the part of the op·erator. ln that con-
nection, the Texas case, Zuniga vs. Storey, 1951 Texas 
239 SW 2d 125, cited by D~efendant in D·efendant's Brief 
Page 14, notes, P. 127 : 
"Animals subjected to the treatment they 
receive in rodeo shovvs become frightened, infuri-
ated, and hence dangerous, and rodeo operators 
are charged with knowledge of the fact." 
Defendant cites that case, Defendant's Brief, P. 14, 
for the proposition: 
"While operators of rodeos ... n;:e not l1a~)l(~ 
as insurers, they are obligated to usc~ rcasonah1<· 
care in keeping their shovv anjt.nals ~~'<'Ul\_'ly pPll-
ned and housed so that they \vill not get loose 
upon the public street. ... " 
That general staternent at the beginning of the 
opinion, P. 125, referring to Hshow anilnah;" still does 
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not tell us what the law is, even in Texas, "\Vl th respt·et to 
an adequate fence. There the bull escaped through a 
gate '·'at a time when other gates leading outside \\"t•re 
also open," P. 127, and the bull ultimately injured plain-
tiff two miles away from ·w·here the bull escaped, and the 
main question seemed to be on the foreseeability of the 
ultimate injury. 
In South Dakota as in California a 1nuch stronger 
instruction than Instruction K o. 12, 'vould have been 
sustained, as indicated in .1inderson rs. Anderson) 1918 
South Dakota 168 NW 85·2, a case involving injuries fro1u 
a bull of known-dangerous disposition. There the con1t 
said, P. 852 : 
"It is the theory of the plaintiff as stated in 
the first counter complaint that a person kc'eping 
a bull or other ani1ual kno\\·n to be of vicious 
tendencies is liable for such injuries as may be 
caused by such animal, regardless of the degree 
of care exercised by such owner in restraining and 
controlling such animal or the precautions taken 
by the owner of such anin1al to prevent its doing 
injury. We believe this contention is supported 
by reason and by the weight of authority. The 
rule is stated in Congress t~s. Empire, 99 US 659, 
25 L.Ed. 487, as follows : 
'Whoever keeps an animal accustomed to 
attack or injure Inankind, with a kno,vledge 
of its dangerous propensities, says Addison, 
is p.rima facie liable in an action for damages 
at the suit of any person attacked or injure? 
by the animal, 'Yithout proof of any negh-
gence or default in the securing or taking 
care of the animal; the gist of the action 
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being the keeping of the animal after knowl-
edge of its mischevious disposition. 3 C.J. 
88.' " 
"But this rule is subject to the following 
qualification: If the injured party is guilty of 
negligence that co:ntributed directly to the injury, 
such negligence would be a defense to the action. 
Behunin vs. Moore, Nebraska 15 NW 326 .. That 
the bull in question in this case had developed a 
vicious disposition and was in fact a 'dangerous 
animal' prior to and at the time of the injury is 
clearly shown by the evidence. The evidence is 
sufficient also to charge the defendant,vith knowl-
edge of the vicious tendencies of the bull, if in-
deed he did not have actual kno,vledge of such 
fact. These facts unqualified are sufficient to 
establish defendant's liability for the injury .... " 
In the l1 aughn vs. llfiller Bros. case, W. \ 1a. 153 
SE 289, cited by Defendant, Defendant's Brief P. 14, the 
court decided only that in an ape-bite case, negligence 
in restraint of the ape by the exhibitor must be alleged 
in the action for injury, and for failure to so allege the 
affidavit for attachment of the circus property before 
it could get out of town was quashed. The court pointed 
out, Page 290, that "No recovery can be had 'vhere thP 
injured party unnecessarily and voluntary puts herself 
in the way to be hurt, knowing the probably conS('< {11PJH' .·s 
of her act.", and that in West Virginia the "gist of Inod-
ern actions against exhibitors cannot he the IHPl'P kt~ep.ing 
of savage animals but must be the neglect to restrain 
them." 
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with approval by Defendant in its brief, BriPf P. ~0, 
gives the law on dangerous domestic ani1nals as follow~: 
Art. 509. Except as stated in Art. 317, a 
possessor of a domestic animal "" hich he has rea-
son to know has dangerous propensities abnor1nal 
to its class is subject to liability for harn1 caused 
thereby to others, except trespassors on his land, 
although he has exercised the utmost care to 
prevent it from ,doing the harn1. (Art. 517 deals 
with public officers and common carriers.) 
According to 4 Am. J·ur. 'l.d) Animals, Art. 86, P. 
334-
. . . There is no distinction bet,veen the case 
of an animal which breaks through the ta1nencss 
of its nature and is fiPrce and is kno\vn by its 
owners to be so, and one \Yhich is ferae naturaP. 
Citing Molloy vs. Starin) X.Y. 83 NE 588; Benky 
vs. Stepp, Okla. 184 P.2d 615; Oakes vs. Spauld-
ing, 40 Vermont 347. 
4Am. Ju,r. 2d, .Animals, Art. 86, P. 33p reads 
If one knowingly keeps a vicious or dangerous 
domestic animal and has actual knowledge of its 
vicious and dangerous character and that it is 
accustome,d to attack and injure people, he 1nay 
be held liable for the injuries thus inflicted. In 
some jurisdictions, he may be held absolutely 
liable if the injured party \vas not himself at fault, 
and in others he is at least prima facie liable. The 
gist of the action has been characterized as the 
keeping of the animal "Tith knowledge of its 
VICious disposition or the failure to keep it se-
curely. 
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Of interest for historical content espeeially is Peo-
ple vs. SangrenJ 1951 N evv York 98 NE 2d 460, a case 
"rhere dogs known to be vicious killed a boy. The case 
\Vas prosecuted under New YorkJs Penal Code) Art. 1052, 
reading: 
"If the owner of a mischievous animal, know-
ing its propensities, willfully suffers it to go at 
large or keeps it "\vithout ordinary care, and the 
animal \Vhile so at large and not confined kills 
a human being who has taken all the precautions 
\vhich the circumstances permitted to avoid the 
animal, the owner is guilty of manslaughter in the 
second degree." 
The court noted, page 465 : 
"The reason for this legislative action no 
doubt is historical. In _civil cases it has always 
been the rule that the liability of an O\vner of a 
ferocious animal, whether ferae naturae or domi-
tae, see 28 C.J.S.J Animals, domitae, P. 52, \vhich 
attaches for injury done to a third person is ab-
solute where such ani1nal is kept with the O\Vner ,s 
kno\vledge of its ferocious propensities, and it is 
not shown that the person injured voluntarily or 
conciously did anything to bring about the injury 
... In such cases no distinction seems to be made 
between the two classe of aniinals (Addison on 
Torts) 22, 230, ~tth English Ed.), and th(' linbHit:,' 
'vhich attaches for any injury done is absolute, un-
less it can be shown that thP pPrson inj:'rPd vol-
untarily, or consciously, did sornething to bring 
about the injury." 
"The gravamen of the crime in the case at 
bar is the kUling of a hu1nan being by mischievous 
animals which were l:ept without ordinary care 
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by their owner who knew of their propensities. It 
must be remebered that one of the foundation 
stones· of organized society ·- of civilization - is 
the safeguards and preservation of hu1nan lifP. 
The evil which this particular statute aims to 
prevent is the killing of a hu1nan being by a 1nis~ 
chievous animal. This evil, we 1nay note, has not 
only been known to man for countless centuries 
hut is one which he long ago recognized and sought 
to prevent." 1Citing Old Testament) Exodus7 Ch. 
21, Verses 28 and 29·: 
"If an ox gore a 1nan or \VOinan that they 
die: then the ox shall be surely stoned, and 
his flesh shall not be eaten but the owner 
shall be quit." 
''But if the ox \\TPre \Vont to push \vith 
his horn in time past, and it hath been testi-
fied to his owner, and he hath not kept him 
in, but that he hath killed a man or a \Voman; 
the ox shall be stoned, and his owner shall be 
put to death." 
In Sandy vs. Bushey, 1925 ~Iaine, 128 A. 513, the 
court said that where a vicious anin1al \Yhich the o\vner 
knows is accustomed to attack and injure mankind is 
kept he assumes the obligation of an insurer against 
injuries by such animal, .thus following the rule as en-
unciated in the ~California, New York, South Dakota, and 
the restatement excerpts above. l\linnesota in 11 agerty 
vs. Radle, 1949, 37 NW 819, enunciated a similar rule, 
with respeet to a known vicious stallion \Yhich bit a 
child's finger off. 
With Robison vs. Robisoll 7 16 Utah 2d P. :2, 394 r·.2d 
876, we have no quarrel. This is a dynamite blast case 
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{''"tA-r 
\Yhere the court, in co1n1nenting on absolute liability, j;eT' 
fron1 indicating that the rule 'vas abolished in Utah, de-
clined to apply the rule because of the assu1nption of risk 
on t1e part of the injured \\~ho sat astride his horse, 
kno\ving the dyna111ite blast 'vas about to occur·; and tht~ 
c Jurt confir1ned in the footnote, Page 877-
~~I hat ·doctrine (the rule of absolute liability) 
is recognized in Utah, see Madison vs. East Jor-
dan Irrigation Cornpany," 101 Utah 552, 125 P.2d 
para. 7H4. · 
Here the jury was told not that the defendants must 
n1aintain a bull-proof fence, nor that they were absolutely 
liable for anything, nor that they had any absolute duty, 
nor that they were an insurer, but that the defendant 
should use due diligence to keep a safe fence for the use 
intended and to inspect it to ascertain same. 'The language 
'vas simple, fair, and proper. 
POINT III. 
INSTRU,CTIONS GENERALLY WERE CORRECT AND 
ADEQUATE. 
Defendant's Brief, Points III and IV, P. 16, com-
plains that Instruction 13 unfairly emphasized Plaintiff'~ 
theory of recovery. In Instruction 13 thP court notP<l 
Plaintiff's theory respecting defects in the fence, citing 
deficiencies relied upon - it could have cited others, 
including lack of eye-high rail fo1· the anirnal to see -
the instruction ending with language certainly not unfav-
orable to the Defendant -
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" 'But if in connection \vith these 1natters a:s 
you find them to be you believe that defendant 
acted as a reasonably prudent person would have 
acted under the same or sin1ilar circumstances, 
or if you have a reasonable doubt as to \vhethe1· 
or not it so acted, then you cannot find that there 
was negligence.' " 
D~efendant complains that its theory of defense \Yas 
not set forth by instruction; ho\vever, Defendant failed 
to request such an instruction ( R.-10 to 36), at least \rith 
respect to the fence. Defendant's theory as embodied in 
the evidence of alcoholic odol" about Plaintiff lying uncon-
scious amongst beer cans and \\~his~=ey bottles, and thJ.·cL~ 
adult Indians, including Plaintiff, in their forties at the 
time of the grand entry, carrying beer packs, is certainly 
1nore than generously coverc d in the courfs Instruction 
No. 15 with respect to intoxicating liquor. 
Defendant's theory as to assun1ption of risk \Vas cer-
tainly set forth adequately in Instruction No. 1 ± on that 
subject. 
D~efendant's theory that the bull went through one 
part of the fence rather than another could hardly be set 
forth by instruction, even if it had been requested, since 
one of D·efendant's witnesses, Macey, said the bull went 
under, while another defendant's vvitnesses, Whitesides, 
said it went over the net wire. 
POINT IV. 
THE CO·UR!T PRO·PERLY WITHHELD FROM JURY CON-
SIDERATIO·N CONOEPT'S OF BUSINESS GUEST, LICEN-
SEE, ETC. 
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As Defendant con1plains, Defendant's Brief Point 
';' p. 18, the jury did escape the travails of a journey 
through the jungle of concepts relating to invitees or 
business visitors or guests, and licensees or gratuitous 
licensees, and the allied concepts of licensor, occupier, 
possessor, etc. 
j_1rue, Plaintiff paid no ticket but, under the cases, 
was still a patron and as such entitled to the degree of 
care the court charged; furthermore, he was by express 
invitation, D·-193, under the evidence, an invitee, further-
Inore, he was, by the undisputed evidence R-185·, R-192, 
R-193, R-107, there about defendant's business, i.e., to 
participate. 
Defendant's Brief cites no cases in point on this 
subject and ignores even Hayward vs. Downing, 112 
Utah 508, 189 P. 2d 442. There ,plaintiff boys, with 
tickets to sit in bleachers at State Fair Grounds Colli-
seum to watch wrestling matches, sat on a platform 
where generally forbidden to sit but with permission, 
and platform collapsed, this court ordered a trial, page 
446: 
" ... Where invitee as to one part of the premises, 
receives permission to go upon another part of the 
premises in furtherance of the object or purpose8 
for which he was originally invited upon the 
premises (in this case to vie\v the 'vrestling 
matches), he becomes an invitee a~ to such seeond 
part of the premises." 
The materiality of this case is pointed up when one 
keeps in mind, as the court there said, page 445 : 
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"The duty of the propri<·tor of a l>ln('<' of 
business which is open to public patronagP to U8e 
ordinary care to make the prernises safe for ('118-
tomers is generally limited to that part of tlw 
premises designed, adopted, and prepared for the 
accommodation of the customers, or to \\"hich cus-
tomers may reasonably be expected to go." 
In Winterowd vs. Christensen, 6S TT+~ ll !'1 1-G •1;)1 r. 
360, plaintiff, who was injured in a grandstand when 
plank broke, had paid a ticket to get into the Lagoon 
resort but not into the ballga1ne at the san1e area and, 
although the court found that the ballga.me \vas open to 
visitors at the resort, the court talked about t1H · indrce-
n1ent of people into the area, saying, Page 361: 
''. . . We think the eirctunstances prl'~·wntPd a 
typical case of invitation on the part of the de-
fendant ... " 
and the court further said : 
"Now with respect to the questions of negli-
gence, it is well settle,d that the owner or occu-
pant of premises who induces other to carne upon 
it by invitation, express or inlplied, owes to them 
the duty of using reasonably or ordinary care 
to keep the premises in a safe and suitable condi-
tion so that they will not be unnecessarily or un-
reasonably exposed to danger." (Italics ours.) 
And in Larkin vs. Salt .Air Beach Co1npany, 30 Utah 
SG, 83 P. 686, where a baby dro\vned at Salt Air, the 
court talked about not whethl\r the particular victin1 had 
paid a ticket, although the evidence shovved that tickets 
\Ycre purchased, but about whether defendant maintained 
a public bathing resort on a lake to \vhich persons in 
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general vvere invited to bathe for admission fees charged. 
(SeeP. 690, 2nd column.) 
In Hahn 'CS. Perkins, N. Carolina, 46 SE 24 85-±, 
\rhel·e a boy dro\vned at a public S\vinnning pool ton-
ducted bY defendants for l)l'Ofit it is apparent fro1n the 
" ' 
opinion that no ticket \Vas paid and the t0st U)Cl.i ·whether 
t,tc place was cond~ucted for p·rofit and whether or 1~ot 
the victim was a patron, the court saying, P. 856: 
"Since the intestate entered the place of rec-
reation conducted by the defendants for profit in 
the charter of a patron, he occupied the status 
of an invitee." (Italics ours.) 
In Parker vs. C1tshman, 195 Fed. 715, 3 N.1C.C.A. 92, 
22 ALR 629, where a lion seized a girl through the bars 
at a wild animal show, the court held plaintiff's failure 
to pay a ticket did not relieve defendant from "exercising 
a high degree of care for her safety." 
In the instant case the uncontroverted evidence is 
that Plaintiff sought a chance to ride in the rodeo (R-185, 
R-192, R-193, R-107) and this is substantiated by De-
fendant's witness (R-247), "'\vho testified that Plaintiff 
sought out the rodeo operator, Robertson (R--2-17). This 
circumstance inextricably connected Plaintiff with the 
business and profit motives of the Defendant. llo\\·ever, 
the writer believes the fact of his being ther<· alone to 
\vitness the amusement rendered him a patron nndc 1· the 
Hahn vs. Perkins case above. 
That Plaintiff was in the place by invitation as well 
as in the status of a patron (if not in the character of a 
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potential e1nployee and perfor1ner), is undisputed in the 
evidence (R-193). A case \Yhere there \\'"as non-pay1nent 
but express invitation is Plaskett vs. Benton Warren 
Agricultural Society, (Indiana), 89 NE 968, 90 NE 908, 
where a t\velve-year-old boy \Vas adn1itted to the fair-
grounds without paying an admission fee, although he 
should have paid, but where he "·as admitted without 
question and just invited in. 
Connecticut met the issue squarely in Nordgren vs. 
Strong, Connecticut 1930, 149 A. 201, a case of a public 
an1usement to which people can1e \\'"ithout paying an ad-
lnittance fee, the operator relying upon rentals, lockers, 
refreshments, etc., for his ineoine, the court saying, P. 
204---
"All who visit a public resort of the character 
of Strong's pavilion are patrons of the proprietor, 
\Vhether they have paid the proprietor anything 
or not; to all who crune to his resort he owed the 
duty of exercising reasonable care." 
Clearly, no instruction regarding business visitors or 
licensees was necessary or appropriate. 
POINT V. 
ME'DICAL TESTIMONY O·F DR. HAIGHT WAS PROPER-
LY RECEIVED. 
See Statement of Facts in this brief, P. ----····· Dr. 
lfaight's testimony \vas at first excluded b~· the court 
(1{-~:~1) then ad1nitted (R-~31), \vhen the court "·as re-
lllindcd ho\\· the san1e \\·as tied in by the testi1nony of 
l_.~atT~· l3ill To1n (R-103) and Plse\vhere (R-187, R-188, 
R·-~-±2). 
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·The causal relationship was abundantly and irre-
futably established. 
POINT VI. 
THE AWARD WAS MO·DEST AND N·OT EXC·ESSIVE. 
Please see Statement of Facts in this brief, P. ------· 
At the time of the accident Frank Bill T·om was age 38, 
in good health, could hear well, could perform his work 
well. He suffered a sever skull fracture -vvith brain dam-
age, with permanent-partial disability, permanent hear-
ing impairment, and permanent impairment of working 
capacity, to the extent that, according to the wife, the 
children must now be depended upon for support (R-
179). 
The verdict was modest, only. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's duty was properly and fairly stated; 
the jury's finding of breach of that duty and of proxi-
mate cause was abundantly supported by the evidence; 
defendant was fully protected by the instructions; medical 
evidence rulings were proper ; damages weTe modest; and 
the jury verdict should be upheld. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GAYL,E, D·E,AN HUNIT' 
Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake 'City, Utah 
and 
D:WIGHT' L. KING 
2121 South State Street 
Salt Lake 'City, Utah 
Attorneys for P'laintiff-
R.espondent 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
